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Off-farm labor supply in Canada is modeled using separate off-farm labor participation and off-farm
labor supply equations, which allows variables to affect participation and labor supply differently. The
data used in this study are from Statistics Canada’s Agriculture-Population Linkage Database, which
links the Population Census for 1986 to a 20% sample from the Census of Agriculture. Results indicate
that age, education and wages have large, significant and opposite effects on participation and supply,
and that government efforts to stabilize and supplement farm incomes through rural employment programs may have less effect on labor allocation decisions than do the underlying demographic factors
and regional and farm characteristics.
Nous modélisons ici les disponibilités d’emploi extérieur (hors-ferme) pour les agriculteurs, utilisant
des équations distinctes pour la participation aux emplois extérieurs et pour l’offre des emplois
extérieurs, ce qui permet de laisser les variables influer différemment sur les deux éléments. Les données utilisées proviennent de la base de données de Statistique Canada sur le couplage agriculture-population, laquelle relie le recensement de la population de 1986 à un échantillon de 20 % prélevé sur le
recensement de l’agriculture. Les résultats font voir que l’âge, le niveau de scolarisation et les salaires
ont de grands effets, significatifs mais opposés, sur l’utilisation et sur les disponibilités d’emplois
extérieurs et que les initiatives de l’État pour stabiliser et compléter le revenu agricole au moyen de
programmes d’emploi rural auraient moins d’effets sur les décisions d’attribution des emplois que les
facteurs sous-jacents relevant de la démographie et des caractéristiques particulières de chaque région
et exploitation.

INTRODUCTION
Determining the factors associated with
whether a farmer works off-farm or not, and
for how many hours, has implications for
policies and programs directed toward rural
economies and the well-being of farm families. Farmers’ responsiveness to local market
conditions, and how that responsiveness
changes as the underlying demographic factors (e.g., age, education, family structure)
change, will affect the design and effectiveness of government programs. For example,

a program designed to increase and/or stabilize farm family incomes through rural job
creation may not be effective if the offered
wages are below most farmers’ reservation
wage or if the reservation wage may change
as age and education levels change.
Previous off-farm labor supply studies
have limited applications in Canada. Perhaps
the most important factor is that the great
majority of the studies were in the U.S. (e.g.,
Gould and Saupe 1989; Huffman and Lange
1989; Lass and Gempesaw 1992; Sumner
1982). Given common culture and technology,

it is not heroic to assume that Canadian and
American farmers have similar behaviors.
Nevertheless, Canada and the U.S. may have
enough differences to question the assumption that off-farm labor supply is the same in
both countries. Previous studies of off-farm
labor supply in Canada are dated and/or are a
simple reporting of cross-tabulations of characteristics of farmers (Bollman 1973) or have
estimated off-farm labor supply for a single
province (Furtan et al 1985). Moreover, previous studies may have had biased results
due to not adjusting for censored data; i.e.,
both off-farm labor participants and nonparticipants were included in a single-equation
model (Furtan et al 1985). This approach
restricts the variables that affect the decision
to participate in the off-farm labor market
and labor supply to the same sign. However,
factors that affect the likelihood of working
off-farm may not have the same effect on the
amount of time spent working off-farm.
This study estimates off-farm labor supply in Canada. Sample selection bias due to
including both off-farm labor participants
and nonparticipants in the sample is tested
for and appropriate adjustments made. A
two-stage model of the decision to work offfarm and then the number of hours worked
off-farm yields unbiased results of off-farm
labor in Canada by region and commodity
type. The data used in this study link the
1986 Population Census to the Census of
Agriculture. This paper is the first time offfarm labor supply for all of Canada has been
published using this unique data set.
THE MODEL
To establish an off-farm labor supply function, consider a farm operator whose utility is
assumed to be a function of goods, G, purchased for PG, and leisure, L:
U = U(G, L), where UG > 0, UL > 0 (1)
Utility is maximized subject to time, wages,
farm profits and other income constraints.
Total time available, T, is allocated between

farm work, FW, off-farm work, OFW, and
leisure:
T = FW + OFW + L

(2)

Income is generated through wages, W, farm
profits and other income, V. Wages depend
on human capital characteristics, H, and
labor market conditions, M:
W = W(H, M)

(3)

Farm profits are determined by farm output
price, PF, and farm output, Q, which is a concave production function:
Q = f(FW, X; H, E, F)

(4)

Output depends on the amount of labor time
spent on the farm and other inputs, X, purchased at price PX, given human capital characteristics, H, farm characteristics, E, and
family characteristics, F.
Following Huffman (1980, 1991), our
farmer behaves as if she maximizes:
H = (G, L, FW, OFW, λ, γ; PG, PF, PX,
H, E, F, V,T )
= U(G, L) +λ[PFf(.) – PXX +
W(.)OFW + V – PGG]
γ[T – FW – OFW – L]

(5)

Taking the first-order conditions of Eq. 5,
assuming an interior solution and substituting, one can obtain:
OFW* = T – FW* – L*
= OFW(W, PF, PG, PX,T , H, E, F, V) (6)
where * indicates an optimum obtained from
the first-order conditions.
Given little variation in prices and time
available, off-farm labor supply can be modeled as a function of market wages, human
capital, farm and family characteristics and
other income1:
OFW* = OFW(W, H, E, F, V)

(7)

ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURES
Not all farmers participate in off-farm work.
To estimate off-farm labor supply, it is necessary to have wage rates both for farmers
who work off-farm and for those who do not
work off-farm. The shadow wage rates for
farmers not working off-farm can be predicted from a wage equation estimated from
information obtained from those operators
who work off-farm. However, operators who
work off-farm may be systematically different in terms of unobservable characteristics
from those who do not work off-farm.
Prediction of the wage rate based on estimates obtained from a censored sample of
operators who work off-farm may be subject
to selection bias. As a result, ordinary least
squares estimates may be biased and inconsistent.
Given that estimates of off-farm labor
supply not corrected for censored data will
be biased and inconsistent, a three-step procedure is used to correct for the censored
nature of the data (Heckman 1974, 1976,
1979). First, an off-farm participation equation is estimated in order to obtain an inverse
Mill’s ratio and an earnings function for
labor market participants. Second, the earnings function equation is used to predict the
opportunity or shadow wages for farmers
who do not work off-farm. Third, the predicted wage rate is included for non-off-farm
workers in the estimation of the off-farm
labor supply. The econometric procedures
are as follows.
Off-farm labor participation can be
modeled as:
z = ax + u

(7)

where z = 1 if the farmer works off-farm, z =
0 otherwise. Each farm operator has a reservation wage:
Yr = h(H, E, F, V)

(8)

and faces a market wage Ym. If Ym > Yr, then
z = 1. Otherwise, z = 0. Yr is not observable.
However, actual wages received, y, and the

factors in Eq. 7 are observable. Wages
received can be modeled as:
y = bx + e

(8*)

where x is a vector of the variables in Eq. 8.
z = 1 if wages y > 0, and z = 0 if y = 0. Given
e, u ~ n(0, σi) with correlation ρr, Eq. 8* is
estimated as:
E[y | z = 1] = bx + ρσeλ(αu) + v

(9)

where λ(αu) = φ(ax)/Φ(ax), and φ and Φ are
the standard normal pdf and CDF, respectively, for off-farm labor participants.
Wages are then estimated including λ as
an explanatory variable. If λ is significant,
then the censored sample (i.e., only off-farm
labor participants) is biased and Heckman’s
procedure must be used with λ correcting for
the bias. This predicted wage rate is used as
an explanatory variable in the off-farm labor
supply equation.
Off-farm labor supply is estimated with
the aggregate sample using a Tobit procedure. A Tobit procedure is appropriate as it
combines Probit and truncated regression to
account for off-farm labor participation and
off-farm labor supply (Killingsworth 1983).
However, the Tobit model restricts the variables that explain participation and the
amount of off-farm labor supplied to the
same sign (Lin and Schmidt 1984). The significance of this restriction can be tested by
estimating the three models and computing:
LR = –2[lnLT – (lnLP +lnLTR)

(10)

where LT, LP and LTR are the likelihoods for
the Tobit, Probit and truncated regression
models, respectively. If the restrictions
imposed by the Tobit model are not valid,
modeling off-farm participation and labor
supply separately using Probit and truncated
regression procedures is preferable.
DATA
The data used in this study are from Statistics
Canada’s Agriculture-Population Linkage

Database of census-farm operators, which
links the Population Census for 1986 to a
20% sample from the Census of Agriculture.
A census-farm was defined as an agricultural holding with sales of agricultural products
of at least $250 in the previous 12 months.2
The aggregate sample had 53,143 observations, of which 29,892 reported off-farm
earnings. Summary statistics for off-farm
labor participants and nonparticipants characteristics are reported in Table 1.
Twenty-nine of the 36 variables listed in
Table 1 are significantly different between
off-farm labor participants and nonparticipants. Participants are usually younger, have
more formal education and have fewer years
of experience farming. Nonparticipants
report gross farm sales almost three times as
large as that of participants. Intuitively, one
would expect farm type to be significant in
explaining whether a farmer participates in
off-farm work. This expectation clearly
holds for dairy and beef cattle operations –
i.e., dairy farmers are much less likely to
work off-farm than are beef farmers – but
differences are much smaller, though still
significant, for other types of operations.
Family characteristics appear to be important. Nonparticipants are more likely to
have a son and/or spouse in agricultural
occupations. Having a spouse in a nonagricultural occupation is associated with
increased participation. Likewise, nonparticipants reported lower spousal income,
but higher farm income, family income and
government support. Labor market conditions as proxied by population density and
the local male unemployment rate have
mixed affects. Participants appear to live in
more densely populated areas, but the difference is not significant, while the male unemployment rate in their local area is significantly higher. Lastly, off-farm participation
is significantly different across Canada. Offfarm labor participation is more likely in
British Columbia, Ontario and Atlantic
Canada, and less likely in the prairies and
Quebec. Further details are available in
Swidinsky et al (1998).

RESULTS
Probit Equation
The Probit equation of off-farm labor participation used to derive the inverse Mill’s
ratio, λ (i.e., the ratio of the standard normal
pdf and CDF for off-farm labor participants),
has a pseudo R2 of 0.23 and correctly predicts 75% of the 53,143 observations.
Twenty-seven of its 32 variables are significant. However, as the purpose of the Probit
equation is to derive the inverse Mill’s ratio,
the parameter estimates are not reported and
no inferences are made about the estimates.
Wage Equation
Results for the off-farm wage equation,
adjusted for selectively bias, are reported in
Table 2. Only 17,947 of the 23,251 operators
who reported off-farm work also reported
wage earnings. Hence, off-farm wages are
estimated using the smaller sample. The
inverse Mill’s ratio is positive and significant
at the 5% level, indicating that farmers who
work off-farm have unmeasured characteristics that command higher wages than nonparticipating farmers. Not adjusting for these
unmeasured characteristics can cause selectivity bias. Gunter and McNamara (1990)
report similar results.
Results for the wage equation are mostly as expected. Wages increase with level of
education, and increase at a decreasing rate
with experience. Wages also increase with
the local population density and the local
male unemployment rate. Somewhat surprising is that region does not significantly affect
wages. It is possible that regional wage differences are fully captured by population
density and unemployment rate.
Tobit Equation
The single-equation Tobit model is tested
against the alternate specification as outlined
in Eq. 10. The resulting chi-square of 13,461
far exceeds the critical value of 49.52.
Hence, the single-equation Tobit model is
rejected in favor of separate Probit and truncated regression models.

Table 1. Summary statistics of off-farm labor participants and nonparticipants, Canada, 1986
Variable
Human capital characteristics (H):
Age (years)
Education (years)
Farm experience (yes = 1):
Started farming before
1966
1966–71
1971–76
1976–81
1981–86
Farm characteristics:
Gross farm sales ($)
Farm type (yes = 1):
Dairy
Cattle
Hogs
Poultry and eggs
Wheat
Other field crops
Fruit and vegetables
Other farm types
Type of ownership (yes = 1):
Sole proprietorship
Partnership
Corporation

Nonparticipant

Participant

Z-test

47.17
(11.58)
10.2
(2.98)

42.51
(10.89)
11.4
(3.38)

–46.67*

0.44
(0.50)
0.10
(0.30)
0.15
(0.36)
0.11
(0.32)
0.20
(0.40)

0.20
(0.40)
0.07
(0.25)
0.16
(0.37)
0.20
(0.40)
0.39
(0.49)

–59.24*

100,281
(243,499)

34,492
(94,002)

0.18
(0.39)
0.20
(0.40)
0.05
(0.23)
0.02
(0.14)
0.17
(0.37)
0.24
(0.42)
0.04
(0.18)
0.11
(0.31)

0.04
(0.20)
0.27
(0.45)
0.04
(0.18)
0.02
(0.15)
0.15
(0.36)
0.25
(0.43)
0.05
(0.22)
0.18
(0.38)

0.80
(0.41)
0.13
(0.34)
0.08
(0.27)

0.85
(0.36)
0.12
(0.32)
0.03
(0.18)

42.91*

–14.40*
1.92
26.34*
48.75*

–95.95*

–50.38*
20.38*
–10.21*
2.99*
–5.81*
4.10*
8.55*
23.57*

17.63*
–5.71
–21.14*

Table 1 continued from page 5
Family characteristics (F) (yes = 1):
Son in agricultural occupation
No spouse
Spouse in agricultural occupation
Spouse in nonagricultural occupation
Other spouse

Other income (V):
Spouse’s earned income ($)
Other family income ($)
Net farm income ($)
Family and farm income ($)
Government farm support ($)

Labor market conditions (M):
Population density (persons/km2)
Male unemployment rate (%)

Region (yes = 1):
British Columbia
Prairies
Ontario
Quebec
Atlantic

Observations
aStandard

0.14
(0.35)
0.18
(0.39)
0.33
(0.47)
0.25
(0.43)
0.24
(0.53)

3,992
(8,130)
3,102
(11,231)
11,234
(24,740)
19,814
(29,097)
21,855
(43,979)

0.08
(0.27)
0.14
(0.35)
0.17
(0.38)
0.43
(0.49)
0.27
(0.44)

6,012
(10,111)
2,187
(26,249)
2,168
(15,323)
13,310
(35,072)
7,753
(26,088)

33.60
(98.14)
9.60
(4.46)

35.85
(92.84)
10.13
(4.57)

0.06
(0.23)
0.53
(0.50)
0.22
(0.41)
0.17
(0.37)
0.03
(0.18)

0.09
(0.29)
0.50
(0.50)
0.26
(0.44)
0.11
(0.31)
0.04
(0.20)

29,892

23,251

deviations are reported in parentheses.
*Significantly different at the 5% level.
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Agriculture Match, unpublished data.

–24.30*
–13.39*
–41.94
42.87*
7.62*

32.12*
–15.23
–73.01*
–41.76*
–86.37

–0.44
14.76*

16.90*
–7.62*
11.47*
–18.83
6.39*

Table 2. An off-farm wage model for labor market participants in Canada, 1986
Variable
Intercept
Education
Experience
Experience2
Population density
Male unemployment rate
British Columbia
West
Ontario (omitted)
Quebec
Atlantic
λ
Model statistics:
Observations
R2

Parameter estimate
3.416
0.53*
0.035*
–0.0005*
0.0004*
0.011*
–0.043
–0.017
–0.001
–0.254
0.050*

t-statistic
65.02
21.93
13.98
–10.81
5.44
4.80
–1.35
–0.97
–0.05
–6.245
2.14

17,947
0.43

*Significant at 5% level.

Probit and Truncated Regression
Equations
Parameter estimates and marginal probabilities for the Probit model of off-farm labor
participation and the parameter estimates and
elasticities at the means for off-farm labor
supply for the truncated regression model are
reported in Table 3. Wages are adjusted for
selection bias in both models. The Probit
equation correctly predicts 95% of the observations and has a pseudo R2 of 0.50. The
truncated regression equation has a log likelihood of –137,083. Twenty-nine of 34 variables are significant (at the 5% level) in the
Probit equation and 18 of 34 in the truncated
regression equation. Fourteen of the variables have different signs in the two models.
Human capital, H, as proxied by age,
education, experience and wages is significant in explaining both labor participation
and labor supply. As age increases, the probability of working off-farm decreases at an
increasing rate, but the amount of time
worked off-farm increases at a decreasing
rate with age. Education also has mixed
signs. An increase in education has the greatest negative marginal affect of all the variables on the probability of working off-farm,

but for those farmers who do work off-farm,
education increases the number of hours
worked off-farm. The more experience a
farmer has, as indicated by when the farmer
first entered into farming, appears to
decrease both the probability of labor participation and labor supply. However, a farmer
with five to ten years’ experience is more
likely to work off-farm than farmers with
either less or more experience, while labor
supply more consistently decreases with
years of experience.
Wages are significant in both equations,
but positive for labor participation and negative for labor supply. This backward-bending
labor supply curve is consistent with theory
and is discussed later. Wages are highly significant in both equations and the marginal
probability of wages in labor participation is
the fourth highest and the elasticity of wages
is relatively high in labor supply.
Farm characteristics, E, are significant
in both equations. Size of operation as indicated by gross farm sales is negative and significant in both models, as expected. Type of
farm is significant in off-farm participation
for seven of the eight farm types modeled,
but only two farm types are significant in

Table 3. Probit model of off-farm labor participation and truncated regression model of off-farm labor
supply in Canada, 1986a
Probit model of
off-farm labor participation
Variable
Intercept

Human capital (H):
Age
Age2
Education

Farm experience:
Entry before 1966
Entry 1966–1971
Entry 1971–1976 (omitted)
Entry 1976–1981
Entry 1981–1986
Wage

Farm (E):
Gross farm sales

Type:
Dairy
Cattle
Hogs
Poultry
Wheat
Crops (omitted)
Fruits and vegetables
Other

Truncated regression model
of off-farm labor supply

Marginal probability

Parameter

–88.83*
(–117.1)

–32.20

304.9
(4.41)

–1.99*
(–112.14)
0.02*
(108.69)
–2.529*
(–95.297)

–0.72

Parameter

0.041
(1.292)
–0.131*
(–3.128)
0.403*
(11.739)
0.263*
(8.288)
36.900*
(122.809)

0.007
–0.917

0.015
–0.047

0.146
0.095
0.375

10.76*
(6.73)
–0.117
(–7.309)
10.116*
(4.856)

Elasticity

2.625
–1.30
0.662

–21.515*
(–6.832)
–3.069
(–0.764)

–0.024

16.582*
(5.750)
16.581*
(6.102)
–52.065*
(–01.973)

0.019
0.036
–0.299

–0.481*
(–46.865)

–0.174

–18.207*
(–21.417)

–0.105

–1.389*
(–31.411)
–0.137*
(–4.464)
–0.800*
(–15.543)
–0.174*
(–2.361)
0.053
(1.653)

–0.503

–52.824
(–9.236)
0.204
(0.078)
–4.567
(–0.888)
8.485
(1.471)
14.007*
(4.697)

–0.012

–0.409*
(–7.824)
–0.659*
(–16.449)

–0.148

–4.259
(–0.984)
–12.115*
(–3.557)

–0.001

–0.050
–0.290`
–0.063
0.019

–0.239

0.0003
–0.0009
0.001
0.012

–0.013

Business organization:
Sole proprietorship
Corporation

–0.024
(–0.812)
–0.458*
(–8.701)

–0.009
–0.166

–3.879
(–1.422)
17.603*
(3.258)

–0.019

–4.543
(–1.317)
–31.524*
(–10.676)

–0.002

–29.023*
(–10.328)
–6.063*
(–2.565)

–0.029

2.699*
(2.793)
–0.103
(–0.345)
–0.080
(–0.7250
–3.493*
(–6.762)

0.009

0.003

Partnership (omitted)
Family (F):
Son
No spouse
Spouse employed in
agricultural

0.078*
(2.194)
–0.682*
(–22.006)

0.028
–0.247

–0.426*
(–14.904)
0.195*
(6.632)

–0.154

–0.041*
(–3.271)
Investment income
–0.020*
(–6.956)
Farm net income
–0.131*
(–24.181)
Government support income –0.036*
(–5.870)

–0.015

Spouse nonagricultural

0.071

–0.025

–0.015

Other spouse (omitted)
Exogenous income (V):
Spouse’s income

Labor market conditions (M):
Population density
–0.015*
(–90.694)
Male unemployment
–0.353*
(–84.289)
Region:
British Columbia
Prairies
Ontario (omitted)
Quebec
Atlantic Canada

–0.007
–0.047
–0.013

–0.006
–0.128

0.817*
(16.498)
0.210*
(7.413)

0.296

–0.636*
(–15.501)
8.926*
(93.101)

–0.231

0.076

3.236

0.069*
(4.914)
–0.603
(–1.584)

–0.0001
–0.00008
–0.136

0.014
–0.035

–32.046*
(–7.810)
–33.548*
(–14.370)

–0.017

–35.930*
(–9.689)
–26.522
(–3.204)

–0.023

–0.095

–0.006

Model statistics:
Observations
Chi-square
Correlation coefficient
Log likelihood
Total percentage
correctly predicted

53,143
52,822
0.50
–10,008

23,251

–137,080

95

a

t-statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5% level.

labor supply. Dairy operations have the
largest decrease in marginal probability of
off-farm participation, followed by hog operations and “others.” Both dairy and hogs are
negative, but not significant in labor supply.
Having a wheat farm has a positive effect on
both off-farm participation and labor supply,
but it is significant in only labor supply.
Type of business organization is the
other farm characteristic included. Being a
sole proprietorship has no significant effect
on either labor participation or labor supply.
Being incorporated has a significant negative
effect on labor participation and a significant
positive effect on labor supply.
Family characteristics, F, has mixed
effects. Having a son working on the farm
increases the probability of off-farm work,
but decreases (not significantly) the number
of hours worked. Not having a spouse is negative and significant in both equations, as is
having a spouse who works in agriculture.
However, a spouse working but not in agriculture has a significant and positive affect
on off-farm participation and a negative and
significant effect on the amount of labor supplied.
Exogenous income, V, also had mixed
effects. Spouse’s income is significant in
both equations, but it is negative in off-farm
participation and positive in labor supply.
Other exogenous income has a negative and
significant affect on off-farm participation.
Government support payments are negative
and significant in decreasing both off-farm
participation and labor supplied.

Labor market conditions, M, have
small, significant affects on labor participation and supply. Increased population density is negatively associated with off-farm participation but positive in labor supply. The
male unemployment rate is negative in both
equations, but significant only in off-farm
participation.
Lastly, region of Canada has a significant effect on the parameter estimates in both
equations. Compared with Ontario (the omitted region), all other regions except for
Quebec have greater labor participation but a
lower labor supply.
DISCUSSION
Using two separate equations to estimate offfarm labor participation and labor supply
allows for mixed effects, and hence insights,
that would not be possible from a singleequation model. Fourteen of the variables
have different signs in the Probit and truncated regression equations. A single-equation
model would have restricted these variables
to one sign, limiting the explanatory power
of the model.
An example of the insights gained
through the two-equation approach is how
human capital, H, as proxied by age, education, experience and wages, affected off-farm
labor participation and labor supply. In the
unreported single-equation Tobit model of
labor supply, education is negative.
However, in the two-equation model, more
education decreases the likelihood of offfarm labor participation, but increases the

hours worked for those who do work offfarm. A reasonable explanation of these
opposite signs is that the marginal productivity of farm work likely increases with education, which increases the returns from farm
work and decreases the need to supplement
farm income with off-farm work. However,
for those who do work off-farm, their higher
education also increases their value off-farm
in terms of higher wages and hence the number of hours worked. Note that human capital, in particular age and education, has the
largest effect of all the variables in terms of
marginal probabilities and elasticities on
labor participation and labor supply, respectively.
Experience affects labor participation
and supply differently, and is also different
from age. Whereas participation decreases at
a decreasing rate with age, participation has
a U-shaped response to experience. Farmers
with 0–9 years experience and more than 20
years of experience have a greater probability of working off-farm than do those farmers
with 10–20 years of experience. It is possible
that this U-shaped response is related to the
standard growth curve of a business, in
which more time and effort is required in the
middle to high growth phase than in the
early, start-up or later, mature phases of a
business. Labor supply also has different
responses to age and experience. Supply
increases at a decreasing rate with age, but
decreases with years of experience. Hence,
age and experience should be not viewed as
equivalent. A 60-year-old farmer with 20
years of farm experience will likely have a
different off-farm labor supply from a 60year-old farmer with 40 years of farm experience.
Wages also have mixed signs in the two
equations. It is expected that higher wages
lead to greater likelihood of working offfarm, as indicated by the positive wage parameter in the participation equation and as has
been reported in previous studies (Sumner
1982; Furtan et al 1985). Hence, the negative
sign in the labor supply equation is unexpected. However, a backward-bending labor
supply curve is consistent with the underly-

ing theory and can be explained. It is reasonable that there is a threshold of total wages
desired to supplement farm income. Beyond
that threshold, farmers would rather spend
more time on the farm or on leisure and less
time working off-farm. Moreover, experience and education, which increase the offfarm wage, also increase the marginal value
of labor on the farm, increasing the cost of
foregone farm work. Hence, while higher
wages increase the probability of off-farm
participation, higher wages are also associated with a decreased labor supply for those
farmers who do work off-farm.
Farm characteristics, E, have expected
signs. Gross farm sales as a proxy for size are
negative in both labor participation and labor
supply, as expected. The larger the operation,
the less likelihood of working off-farm.
Regardless of the farmer’s productivity on a
per-unit basis (e.g., acres, head), the opportunity cost of time away from the farm is
greater for the operator of a larger farm. In
effect, the reservation wage of the large farm
operator is higher than the reservation wage
of a farm small operator.
Farm type also yields expected signs.
The negative, significant sign for dairy operations has the third largest marginal probability in the labor participation equation.
Only age and education have a larger effect
on the probability of working off-farm. The
relatively inelastic response in the labor supply equation is consistent with expectations:
ceteris paribus, dairy farmers have a high
marginal value of their labor on the farm and
not a lot of flexibility with their time. Hogs
and fruits and vegetables have similar signs
and responses, only of a lesser magnitude.
The signs on cattle and poultry are somewhat
unexpected. The authors’ bias is that both are
part-time enterprises; hence, the negative
signs for labor participation are unexpected.
However, their signs for labor supply are
positive but not significant. Regardless of
sign and significance, the marginal impacts
and elasticities indicate that having a cattle or
poultry operation does not have a large
impact on either labor participation or labor
supply. A similar story can be told for wheat:

it is positive in both equations, significant
only in labor supply, but the marginal probability and elasticity are so small that ceteris
paribus being a wheat farmer has little
impact on labor participation or supply.
“Other” types of operations have negative, significant signs in both equations, but it
is difficult to determine what, if anything, the
estimates indicate. It could be that farmers of
uncommon or nontraditional enterprises are
less likely to work off-farm and, when they
do, it is for fewer hours.
Type of business organization is expected to have a more significant impact.
Partnership is omitted as the default. Sole
proprietorships are expected to be mostly
smaller farms, on which the farmers are more
likely to work off-farm, while members of
corporations are expected to have larger
operations with less likelihood of work offfarm. The signs on corporation are as expected, but the negative and not significant parameter on sole proprietorship is unexpected.
Given the relatively low income level at
which the maximum Canadian marginal tax
rate applies and given the tax savings realized through incorporation, type of business
organization may not be important in estimating and determining behavior of farm
operators. In the past, incorporation indicated a large, highly profitable farm. Today,
given our tax structure, type of business
organization may have little bearing on the
relative size and profitability of a farm enterprise.
Family characteristics, F, appear to
affect both labor participation and labor supply. Previous studies have reported that the
farm operator and spouse’s labor allocation
decisions are jointly determined (Huffman
and Lange 1989; Lass and Gempesaw 1992).
Having a spouse, and the type of work the
spouse does, has a much larger impact on
labor participation than does having a son
working on the farm. Moreover, having a
spouse working, but in not in agriculture, has
more than twice the effect on labor participation as having a son. Hence, having a spouse
working outside agriculture may be indicative of a family receptive to opportunities

off-farm, while having a spouse working in
agriculture may indicate a family view of
few options off-farm. However, in the labor
supply equation, all the family characteristic
variables are very inelastic, indicating that
family structure may affect labor participation, but that it has a relatively small effect
on labor supply.
Exogenous income, V, is expected be
negative in both labor participation and labor
supply. Hence, the positive, and significant,
sign on spouse’s income in labor supply is
somewhat surprising and difficult to explain.
The magnitudes of the marginal probabilities
on labor participation should be noted. Both
net farm income and spouse’s income have a
larger effect on labor participation than does
government support. Hence, changes in farm
income and the long-term trend of increased
labor participation by farm wives can be
expected to have a larger impact on off-farm
work than changes in government programs.
Local labor market conditions, M, also
have a smaller effect on the probability of
working off-farm than expected. Both farm
type and region have a larger affect on labor
participation than local market conditions.
Farmers in B.C., the prairies and Atlantic
Canada are more likely to work off-farm than
farmers in Ontario and Quebec, but for fewer
hours. Hence, gearing rural employment programs to local unemployment rates may have
less impact on a farmer’s labor participation
and labor supply decision than simply gearing those programs to region.
SUMMARY
This study models off-farm labor supply as
separate off-farm labor participation and offfarm labor supply. This approach is preferred
to a single-equation model of off-farm labor
supply because several of the variables in the
model affect participation and labor supply
differently. Age, education and wages have
large, significant effects on both the probability of off-farm labor participation and on
the amount of off-farm labor supplied.
However, increased age and education
decrease the probability of labor participa-

tion and increase labor supply, while
increased wages have the opposite effects.
These opposite effects of a variable on labor
participation and labor supply would be lost
in a single-equation approach.
The data used in this study are unique in
that this is the first published study of offfarm labor supply using Statistics Canada’s
Agriculture-Population Linkage Database of
census-farm operators. As such, it is a
national study of farm operator labor allocation by farm type and region. Previous studies are either dated or have estimated offfarm labor supply for a particular region.
The evidence of a backward-bending
labor supply curve is unexpected and contrary to findings of previous studies, but is
consistent with the underlying theory. The
strong positive response to wages in previous
studies (e.g., Furtan et al 1985) is possibly
due to using a small, regional data set or
more likely because the single-equation
approach confounds labor participation and
labor supply into one response.
Perhaps the most significant factor is
that government efforts to stabilize and supplement farm incomes through rural employment programs may have less effect on labor
allocation decisions than do the underlying
demographic factors of age, education and
experience, the farm type and regional factors. Labor supply is much more elastic with
respect to education than to government support or to local market conditions. Programs
to increase education levels can be expected
to have a greater impact on off-farm employment than programs geared to local market
conditions such as the unemployment rate.
Moreover, as the general education level
rises along with the average age of Canadian
farmers, the reservation wage of those farmers will increase also, further decreasing the
impact of many rural employment programs.
NOTES
1Several

Journal reviewers have questioned
whether farm characteristics (e.g., size and type of
operation) and family characteristics (e.g., presence of a son and/or a spouse and the spouse’s
type of work) should be considered exogenous to

labor allocation decisions. The concern is that
labor allocation decisions are jointly determined
with farm and family characteristics. However,
farm and family characteristics enter the model
through the farm production function, in which
they are considered exogenous fixed or quasifixed inputs. Moreover, Bollman (1979) demonstrated that it is theoretically consistent to model
off-farm work and farm productivity as independent. A relationship between labor supply and
farm and family characteristics is expected, but
the direction of causality is indeterminate. It may
be more reasonable to assume that farm and family characteristics affect short-run labor allocation
decisions, as modeled in this paper, than that
short-run labor allocation decisions affect longrun farm and family structure.
2A Journal reviewer correctly pointed out that a
farm with only $250 of sales in a year is likely a
hobby farm and should not be considered a commercial enterprise; the results may be biased by
including these small-scale farms. However,
given that minimum sales of $250 was Statistics
Canada’s definition of a farm in 1986, and that
policies were made and programs designed based
in part on information from this data, we decided
to follow Statistics Canada’s lead and include all
official designated farms in our sample. Given
this wide range of farm size as indicated by farm
sales, homoscedasticity is tested and not rejected.
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